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This Report, prepared for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,1
provides a brief overview of the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Pegram v
Herdrich (hereinafter referred to as Herdrich).2  This report begins with a brief overview of the debate
in the courts over how to distinguish between legal challenges to the conduct of managed care
companies in which all state remedies are preempted by ERISA and those that may proceed under
state law.  It then summarizes the facts of the Herdrich case and the Court’s holding.  The report
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the decision for federal and state consumer
protection legislation.
A point of caution should be raised.  The Herdrich decision is so new, and its implications so
potentially far-reaching, that legal scholars, policy makers, lawyers, and judges undoubtedly will be
pondering and debating its meaning and reach for years.  However, in light of the enormous
attention now focused on managed care accountability, the decision will attract a great deal of
attention.  Consequently, at least a preliminary analysis is warranted.
1.  Overview of ERISA
Enacted in 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) establishes federal
requirements for employer-sponsored pension and benefit plans.  The United States Department of
Labor estimates that 125 million persons (72% of the workforce and two-thirds of the non-elderly
population) are covered by an ERISA group benefit plan.3
ERISA establishes certain “content” requirements for pensions.  However, in the case of
other benefits (such as health and disability benefits), ERISA contains few substantive requirements.
As a result, employers have near-total discretion over the structure of their health plans, including
the benefits they offer and the organizational and delivery arrangements they provide for.
                                      
1 The Department of Health and Human Services has reviewed and approved policy related information within this
document, but has not verified the accuracy of data or analysis presented within this document.  The opinions expressed
herein are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) or the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.
2 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000); slip op. dated June 12th, 2000.  Hereinafter, all references are to the Slip Opinion.
3 Phyllis C. Borzi, “ERISA and Health Plans: A Primer on ERISA Requirements and a Discussion of Proposals for
Change” (D.C. Bar Association, June, 2000).
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Despite this broad discretion over the design and content of health benefits, ERISA plan
administrators (including entities that operate the health component of an employee benefit plan)
are subject to a “fiduciary standard” obligating them to administer the plan solely in the interest of
the plan’s beneficiaries.4  ERISA defines a “fiduciary” as anyone who exercises discretion or control
over the plan’s assets or administration.5 Under such a standard, coverage decisions by managed care
company employees or contractors would appear to involve the type of discretionary decision-
making over the disposition of plan assets that triggers the fiduciary obligation.  However, where
benefits are found to be improperly denied or withheld, ERISA limits recovery to the value of the
benefits claimed and does not permit damages for the economic or non-economic losses generally
associated with a personal injury; state law remedies that would permit such damages (under theories
of fraud, bad faith breach of contract, or negligence in insurance coverage-decision making, for
example) all would be superceded by ERISA’s sweeping “preemption” rule.6
Because it represents the merger of coverage and health care, managed care makes
distinguishing between coverage decision-making and medical treatment particularly difficult.  In
recent years, courts increasingly have determined that when managed care companies act either
directly or through their network physicians as health care corporations, principles of both corporate
and vicarious liability that have applied to hospitals for some 40 years7 also may apply to them.  As a
result, a health maintenance organization (HMO) that injures a member through substandard
medical conduct (either through its physicians’/agents’ negligence or its own direct failure to
safeguard members from incompetent providers or an inadequate standard of care) may be liable
under state law for damages.8
These HMO negligence cases typically have arisen in the context of individuals who are not
covered by ERISA (e.g., federal and state employees or Medicaid beneficiaries).  In the case of
ERISA plan members, courts have drawn a distinction between cases that allege injury as a result of
a coverage decision and those that challenge the quality of care.9  Where a claim is determined to be
one for coverage, the claim is considered to “arise under” ERISA and all state remedies are
preempted.10  In these instances, the company’s breach of its ERISA fiduciary duties would give the
individual the right to recover the benefit due, but no more.  On the other hand, where the claim is
determined to amount to a challenge to the quality of care received, courts have ruled that state
medical liability laws continue to apply.11
States that have attempted to create remedies for negligent or injurious coverage decision-
making by insurers have seen their laws preempted under ERISA.12  Congress is currently debating
                                      
4 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1).
5 29 U.S.C. §1002(21).
6 Rand Rosenblatt, Sylvia Law, and Sara Rosenbaum, Law and the American Health Care System (Foundation Press, New
York, NY; 1997; 1999-2000 Supplement).
7 See, e.g., Darling v Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965); Jackson v Power, 743 P.2d 1376
(Alaska 1987).
8 See, e.g., Boyd v Albert Einstein Medical Center, 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa.Super. 1988); Petrovitch v Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc.,
719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999); and Jones v Chicago HMO Ltd. Of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000).
9 Dukes v U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3rd 350 (3rd Cir. 1995); In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F. 3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999); Pappas v
Asbel, 724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), vacated and remanded by U.S. Healthcare Systems of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Hosp. Ins.
Co., 120 S. Ct. 2686 (2000).
10 See, e.g., Corcoran v United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
11 See, e.g., Shannon v McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa.Super. 1998).
12 See, e.g., Corporate Health v Texas Department of Insurance, 12 F. Supp. 597 (S.D. Tx. 1998).
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managed care legislation that would address the issue of injuries, although the House and Senate
approaches differ significantly.13
2. The facts of the Herdrich case and the decision
The Herdrich case sits at this complex nexus of ERISA preemption, state medical liability law,
and managed care.
Cynthia Herdrich, insured through her husband’s ERISA-covered employee health plan, was
a member of the Carle Clinic, a physician-owned HMO.  Herdrich sought care for lower abdominal
pain.  Rather than immediately securing an ultrasound diagnosis at a local hospital, Dr. Lori Pegram
decided to order the test through a distant Carle Clinic-owned diagnostic facility that could not
perform the procedure for 8 days.  Herdrich’s appendix ruptured before the 8 days passed and she
developed peritonitis.
Herdrich sued both Pegram and Carle in state court for medical malpractice;14 she also sued
the Clinic for state law fraud.  The essence of her case was medical negligence against the physician
and fraudulent and improper denial of benefits by the company, in which the physician was a part-
owner and which paid physicians through incentive arrangements.
After her state fraud count was dismissed on the basis of the ERISA preemption principles
discussed above,15 Herdrich amended her complaint to charge the Carle Clinic with a violation of
ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirements in its use of physician financial incentives.  The trial court
dismissed her claim of breach of fiduciary duty, holding that the HMO’s financial incentive structure
did not constitute the type of practice that amounts to the exercise of a fiduciary duty.  On appeal,
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held that such an incentive
arrangement did indeed constitute the type of activity that fell within the Clinic’s “fiduciary”
practices within the meaning of ERISA.  The court of appeals further held that the use of such an
incentive arrangement in the case of a physician-owned HMO amounted to a breach of its fiduciary
obligation, because the existence of the incentive arrangement arguably led to a decision to delay and
deny care, thereby creating an improper conflict of interest between the physician- owners of the
plan and their patients.16  After a rehearing on the case, the court of appeals reaffirmed its decision
and the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ request to hear the case.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter stated the question in the case was “whether
treatment decisions made by a health maintenance organization, acting through its physician employees, are fiduciary
                                      
13 The Senate would allow individuals who have won the right to a benefit through external review to recover limited
damages against a managed care company where the company originally failed to provide the benefit that was granted.
The House bill, on the other hand, would allow states to fashion their own remedies for the wrongful denial of coverage,
thereby lifting ERISA’s preemption provisions with respect to these types of coverage decisions.
14 Ms. Herdrich won a malpractice claim against Dr. Pegram for $35,000.
15 ERISA supercedes all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans unless such laws are “saved” as laws regulating
insurance.  Federal courts will dismiss claims against health care companies furnishing employer products if they
consider the claim against the company to be a “claim for benefits” due under an ERISA plan.  See Sara Rosenbaum and
Joel Teitelbaum, Coverage Decisions Versus the Quality of Care: An Analysis of Recent ERISA Judicial Decisions and Their
Implications for Employer-Insured Individuals (Issue Brief #8), Managed Behavioral Health Care Issue Brief Series, The George
Washington University Hirsh Health Law and Policy Program (Washington, DC, April, 2000).
16 Slip. op., p. 4.
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acts within the meaning of [ERISA].”17  In framing the question this way from the outset, Justice
Souter appeared to underscore the Court’s view that the basic issue before it involved the HMO’s
conduct as a medical care provider, rather than its functions as an insurer making coverage and payment
decisions.
Justice Souter began his decision with a review of managed care that makes clear that in the
view of the Court, physician incentive arrangements are part of the inherent design structure of managed
care:
Traditionally, medical care in the United States has been provided on a “fee-for-service” basis. *** In
a fee-for-service system, a physician’s financial incentive is to provide more care, not less, so long as
payment is forthcoming.  The check on this incentive is a physician’s obligation to exercise reasonable
medical skill and judgment in the patient’s interest. *** The defining feature of an HMO is the receipt
of a fixed fee for each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to provide specified health care if
needed. *** Like other risk bearing organizations, HMOs take steps to control costs. *** These cost
controlling measures [Justice Souter identifies several techniques including coverage determinations,
practice guidelines, and utilization review] are commonly complemented by specific financial
incentives to physicians, rewarding them for decreasing utilization of health care services and
penalizing them for what may be found to be excessive treatment. *** Herdrich focuses on the Carle
scheme’s provision for a “year-end distribution[.]” *** The essence of a HMO is that salaries and profits are
limited by the HMO’s fixed membership fees. *** [W]hatever the HMO, there must be rationing and inducement to
ration. 18
In commenting on the design of managed care as one that by definition was structured to
ration care, Justice Souter made clear that it was the province of Congress, which authorized the use
of HMOs in 1973, and not the courts, to determine how far this type of health care structure could
go:
Since inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO scheme, and rationing
necessarily raises some risks, *** any legal principle purporting to draw a line between good and bad
HMOs would embody, in effect, a judgment about socially acceptable medical risk.  *** [S]uch
complicated factfinding and such a debatable social judgment are not wisely required of courts. ***
[C]ourts are not in a position to derive a sound legal principle to differentiate an HMO like Carle’s
from other HMOs.  For that reason, we proceed on the assumption that the decisions listed in
Herdrich’s complaint cannot be subject to a claim that they violate fiduciary standards ***.19
Justice Souter next considered what was encompassed in the “ERISA plan”, a crucial issue
for distinguishing when a claim arises under ERISA and when it involves conduct that is not
reached by the statute.  An ERISA plan, wrote Souter, is the written “scheme” that “comprises a set
of rules that define the rights of a beneficiary and provide for their enforcement.”20  He noted that
rules governing the “collection of premiums, definition of benefits, submission of claims, and
resolution of disagreements over entitlement to services are the sorts of provisions that constitute a
plan.”21  As such, the HMO itself was not the “plan”, even though the contract between the
employer and the HMO might address certain elements of the ERISA plan, such as coverage and
the rules under which a beneficiary will be entitled to care.
                                      
17 Id. at 1 [emphasis added].
18 Id. at 5-8 [emphasis added].
19 Id. at 8-9.
20 Id. at 10.
21 Id.
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Furthermore, he noted, the HMO was not a fiduciary “merely because it administers or
exercises discretionary authority over its HMO business.”22  In the Court’s view, an HMO acts as a
fiduciary only when it is engaged in decisions that involve ERISA plan administration, and only then
is it bound to the fiduciary standard.  Souter made clear that an entity that acts as a fiduciary may
have “financial interests adverse to beneficiaries” and that ERISA requires only that “the fiduciary
with two hats wear only one at a time and wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.”23
As such, it was entirely consistent with ERISA’s scheme that a plan could secure services from a
company with interests adverse to its members and could entrust such a company with fiduciary
obligations.  Furthermore, simply because an HMO signs an agreement with an ERISA-covered
employer, the existence of such an agreement does not turn the HMO into a fiduciary for all of its
conduct, but rather only for those specific actions that a court considers fiduciary acts.
With this background, Justice Souter then concluded that none of Herdrich’s allegations
involved a fiduciary breach within the meaning of ERISA.  Her only complaint was that the Carle
Clinic breached its duty by making treatment decisions through its physicians while simultaneously
offering incentives to withhold care.  This feature of the plan (i.e., the year-end distribution scheme)
was one that the “employer as a plan sponsor was free to adopt *** since an employer’s decision
about the content of a plan are not themselves fiduciary acts.”24
At this point, the decision reached what may turn out to be the heart of the case for future
federal and state legislative reform purposes.  Acknowledging that certain HMO activities would
constitute “fiduciary” actions while others would not, Justice Souter turned to a discussion of which
HMO decisions made through its physicians will be considered fiduciary (and thus covered by
ERISA) and which fall outside the scope of ERISA.  Citing the decision in Dukes v U.S. Healthcare,
Inc.,25 the first case to deliniate the “quality/coverage” distinction, Justice Souter wrote that there are
two types of “arguably administrative” acts:
What we will call pure “eligibility decisions” turn on the plan’s coverage of a particular
condition or medical procedure for treatment.  “Treatment decisions,” by contrast, are choices about
how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s condition: given a patient’s constellation of
symptoms, what is the appropriate medical response?  These decisions are often practically
inextricable from one another ***.  [A] great many and possibly most coverage questions are not
simple yes-or-no questions, like whether appendicitis is a covered condition *** or whether
acupuncture is a covered procedure ***.  The more common coverage question is a when-and-how
question.  Although coverage for many conditions will be clear and various treatment options will be
indisputably compensable, physicians still must decide what to do in particular cases.  The issue may
be, say, whether one treatment option is so superior to another under the circumstances and needed
so promptly, that a decision to proceed with it would meet the medical necessity requirement that
conditions the HMO’s obligation to provide or pay for that particular procedure at that time in the
case. *** In practical terms these eligibility decisions cannot be untangled from physicians’ judgments
about reasonable medical treatment. *** The eligibility decision and the treatment decision [in this
case] were inextricably mixed, as they are in countless medical administrative decisions every day.
The kinds of decisions mentioned in Herdrich’s ERISA count and claimed to be fiduciary in
character are just such mixed eligibility and treatment decisions: physicians’ conclusions about when to use diagnostic
test; about seeking consultations and making referrals to physicians and facilities other than Carle’s; about the proper
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23 Id. at 12-13.
24 Id. at 14.
25 57 F. 3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995).
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standards of care, the experimental character of a proposed course of treatment, the reasonableness of a certain treatment,
and the emergency character of a medical condition.26
In this breathtaking paragraph, the Court appears to have removed from the scope of
ERISA fiduciary acts—and placed squarely in the center of medical practice itself—the vast bulk of
day-to-day decisions made by physicians employed by or under contract to managed care entities
that sell their services to ERISA-covered employers.  According to the Court, these are not “coverage”
decisions that are covered by the fiduciary provisions of ERISA and thus subject to preemption.  They are instead
“mixed eligibility” decisions that amount to treatment itself.  And according to the Court, Congress
never intended that these types of mixed eligibility decisions be viewed as fiduciary in nature.27  In
the Court’s view, were these decisions to be viewed as fiduciary in nature, it would result in “nothing
less than the elimination of the for-profit HMO” since it would outlaw all mixed decision-making in
the course of running an HMO.  Indeed, it is not clear that non-profit HMOs could survive, even
though they had no profit motive per se.
The Court then made indisputably clear what it considers to be the proper remedy in a
“mixed eligibility” case:
[T]he defense of any HMO [to a claim of fiduciary violation in a mixed  eligibility case] would be that
its physician did not act out of financial interest but for good medical reasons, the plausibility of
which would require reference to standards of reasonable and customary medical practice ***.  That
of course is the traditional standard of the common law. *** Thus, for all practical purposes, every claim of
fiduciary breach by an HMO physician making a mixed decision would boil down to a malpractice claim ***.
What would be the value *** of having this kind of ERISA fiduciary action?  It would simply
apply the law already available in state courts ***.  It is true that in states that do not allow malpractice
actions against HMOs the fiduciary claim would offer a plaintiff a further defendant to be sued for direct
liability, and in some cases the HMO might have a deeper pocket than the physician.  But we have
seen enough to know that ERISA was not enacted out of concern that physicians were too poor to be
sued, or in order to federalize malpractice litigation in the name of fiduciary duty for any other reason.
*** On its face, federal fiduciary law applying a malpractice standard would seem to be a
prescription for preemption of state malpractice law, since the new ERISA cause of action would
cover the subject of a state malpractice claim. *** [W]e know that Congress had no such haphazard
boons in prospect when it defined the ERISA fiduciary, nor such a risk to the efficiency of federal
courts as a new fiduciary-malpractice jurisdiction would pose in performing such unheard–of fiduciary
litigation.28
3. Discussion
In the course of deciding the meaning of the outer limits of ERISA, the decision contains
major implications for state and federal policy and the future of litigation against the managed care
industry.
State policy: The Herdrich opinion does much to clarify the point at which, in a managed care
context, ERISA-governed coverage decision-making ends and the quality of medical treatment
begins.29  As the Court noted, in managed care the line between treatment and coverage decisions
                                      
26 Slip op., pp. 15-17 [emphasis added; footnotes omitted].
27 Id. at 18.
28 Id. at 23-25 [emphasis added].
29 Sara Rosenbaum, David Frankford, Brad Moore, and Phyllis Borzi, "Who Should Determine When Health Care is
Medically Necessary?," 340 NEJM 3 (January 21, 1999).
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becomes so blurred that most conduct characterized by the industry as coverage decisions is, as a
practical matter, a decision about treatment that falls within the classic purview of the medical
profession. For this reason, the Court concluded that the proper legal framework in which to judge
such decisions is not ERISA fiduciary law, but rather the law of medical liability, which lies beyond
the legal limits of ERISA.
It is interesting to consider what might have been the outcome of Corcoran v United
HealthCare, Inc.,30 a landmark ERISA decision that helped set in motion the public demand for
managed care reform.  In Corcoran, the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit held that in
substituting outpatient care in for inpatient treatment requested by a personal physician for his high-
risk pregnant patient, United Healthcare—through its utilization management medical staff—was
not practicing medicine but instead was making a coverage determination. Because this coverage
determination was protected by the ERISA preemption shield, United could not be held liable for
the death of the newborn.
In terms of the action that led to the litigation, Corcoran appears to be precisely the type of
“when and how” decision that falls within the Court’s “mixed eligibility” category, and thus would
be covered by state liability law.  In Corcoran, however, the decision-maker was not the patient’s
personal physician but instead, the medical personnel who performed utilization management
functions for the company and with whom Mrs. Corcoran had no direct relationship.  Whether
Herdrich’s holding regarding medical liability for “mixed eligibility” determinations is limited to
decisions made by treating physicians or also reaches the medical judgment of any physician
employed by a managed care company remains unanswered.  But Herdrich does make clear that
HMOs can be liable under state malpractice law for the “mixed eligibility” determinations made by
treating network physicians on behalf of their patients.
Furthermore, in applying medical liability law to HMOs, Herdrich also suggests that a
managed care entity could be liable under state law for corporate acts that result in injuries.  These
acts, whose precedents lie in the law of hospital liability, include conduct such as the failure to select
competent practitioners, failure to monitor the practitioners’ conduct, failure to correct errors, and
failure to institute standards that ensure the quality of patient care.  In this regard, the use of
professionally substandard practice and treatment guidelines arguably could subject an HMO to state
law liability, even were an employer arguably free under ERISA principles to buy a managed care
product that practices substandard care.31
Federal policy: The Herdrich decision has important federal implications.  The Court draws a
distinction between “pure” and “mixed” eligibility decisions.  In applying this formula the Court
appears to suggest that most decisions fall into the “mixed” category and furthermore, that any
decision that requires medical judgment and not merely the reading of a contract should be viewed
as such.  Nonetheless, even if most decisions are “mixed,” not all are.  Some eligibility decisions
would remain “pure” and subject to ERISA while others would not, requiring courts in applying
state medical negligence law to such claims to make a case by case determination as to whether the
challenged decision is mixed or pure.  This is precisely the type of tortured situation in which ERISA
                                      
30 965 F. 2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
31 Compare Jones v Kodak, 169 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) with In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F. 3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999).
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litigants now find themselves, although Herdrich does seem to send a strong message to come down
on the “mixed” side.32
Viewed in this way, the approach taken by the House of Representatives, which would
permit state law to determine the remedies for coverage-related injuries, would appear to be the
approach most consistent with the decision.  Under the House bill, in any state that adopted
comprehensive managed care liability legislation governing both coverage and medical judgment-
based treatment decisions, courts would be relieved from this obligation to continuously parse
claims into those that are “pure” and those that are “mixed.”  While some would argue that such a
move would open the door to a flood of litigation, the expanded use of external appeal systems
under the House bill would appear to limit any such likelihood, since under the House bill, any
coverage decision involving the exercise of medical judgment would be covered by the external
review process.33
Future managed care litigation: Perhaps the most thought-provoking aspect of the decision is the
court’s characterization of the industry itself as one designed to ration care and governed by a
number of structural design principles that simply lie beyond the scope of individual legal challenge.
In Justice Souter’s view, challenging the structural components of managed care would be like
challenging the structure of a hospital.  The question is whether the decision should be read to
preclude all such litigation.
The answer, we think, is “no”, in part because even this decision has clear limits, and
because the decision involves only ERISA.  The Court’s discussion of managed care seems to rest
on the assumption that it is within the operating norm of the managed care industry to use incentive
arrangements.  However, as with any industry, were a member of the industry to stray beyond
accepted norms and to institute practices that lie outside of what is considered acceptable practice,
the analysis offered by the Court would no longer be applicable.  For example, were a company to
operate under irrational medical practice standards that had no basis in reasonable practice or were a
company to actively interfere with the practice of its physicians to the point that they could no
longer treat their patients in a medically ethical way, such practices might themselves, if proven,
constitute a breach of fiduciary responsibility. Furthermore, industry practices and tactics that lie
outside of the norm for managed care might violate other laws, such as the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act, as several lawsuits now pending around the country argue and which
specifically has been held applicable to ERISA arrangements.34  While Congress in authorizing the
                                      
32 However, at the time of this writing, at least one federal court declined to extend Herdrich to a situation in which a
beneficiary of an ERISA-covered plan claimed that her managed care company improperly refused to pay for physical
therapy treatments prescribed by her treating physician.  Schusteric v United Healthcare Insurance Co. of Illinois, 2000 WL
1263581 (N.D. Ill. September 5, 2000).  While noting that the cases were similar “in that both involved allegedly
erroneous determinations by a health insurer that treatment was not medically necessary,” the court characterized Lisa
Schusteric’s claim as one to recover benefits due under ERISA §502 and thus outside the scope of Herdrich’s holding
concerning fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA §1109.  Id.
33 The House bill would deny external appeals for claims related to (1) specific exclusions or express limitations on the
amount, duration, or scope of coverage that do not involve medical judgment, and (2) decisions regarding whether an
individual is covered under the plan.  See Phyllis Borzi and Sara Rosenbaum, Pending Patient Protection Legislation: A
Comparative Analysis of Key Provisions of the House and Senate Versions of H.R. 2990, Prepared for the Kaiser Family
Foundation, Center for Health Services Research and Policy, The George Washington University School of Public
Health and Health Services (Washington, DC, March, 2000).
34 Humana, Inc. v Forsyth, 119 S. Ct. 710 (1999).
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establishment of HMOs in 197335 certainly sought to promote a specific approach to the
organization, financing, and delivery of care, the prepaid group practice structure that existed at the
time looked vastly different from what managed care has evolved into.  Staff model and exclusive
group practice models were the norm; the modern managed care enterprise, with its vast networks
of health providers operating under unbelievably complicated financial schemes, was unheard of.
Nothing in the HMO statute prohibits the reasonable evolution of managed care.  At the same time,
where evidence shows that a member of the industry is using operating tactics that lie outside the
norm, the Herdrich decision would not appear to prohibit litigation against such outliers.
                                      
35 The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §300e et seq.
